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All TSOs, taking into account the following.

Whereas

(1) This document is a common proposal developed by all Transmission System Operators (hereafter referred to as “TSOs”) regarding a methodology for Congestion Income distribution (hereafter referred to as “CID Methodology”) in accordance with Article 73 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 establishing a Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (hereafter referred to as the “CACM Regulation”). This proposal is hereafter referred to as “CID Methodology Proposal”.


(3) This CID Methodology Proposal takes into account the general principles, goals and other methodologies set in the CACM Regulation. The goal of the CACM Regulation is the coordination and harmonisation of capacity calculation and Capacity Allocation in the day-ahead and intraday cross-border markets, and it sets requirements for the TSOs to co-operate on the level of capacity calculation regions (hereinafter referred to as “CCRs”), on a pan-European level and across bidding zone borders. The CACM Regulation sets also rules for establishing capacity calculation methodologies based either on the Coordinated Net Transmission Capacity Approach (“Coordinated NTC Approach”) or the Flow-Based Approach (“FB Approach”).

(4) According to Article 9 (9) of the CACM Regulation, the expected impact of the proposed CID Methodology on the objectives of the CACM Regulation has to be described and is presented below.

(5) The proposed CID Methodology generally contributes to the achievement of the objectives of Article 3 of CACM Regulation or the usage principles for Congestion Income set in Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. In particular, the CID Methodology serves the objective of promoting effective competition in the trading and supply of electricity, non-discriminatory access to cross-zonal capacity as it lays down objective criteria and solutions for the distribution of Congestion Income to be applied by all involved TSOs, thus, creating a solid basis for Congestion Income distribution for the first time at European level. One default solution is provided for all bidding zone borders whereas the CID Methodology allows for specific sharing keys in limited specific cases under the conditions described herein. This limited room for flexibility under certain conditions allows capturing appropriately the specificities of different Interconnectors and national frameworks (e.g. legal framework on congestion management for exempted Interconnectors).

(6) Congestion Income indicates how much market participants value the possibility for cross-border trade, how Interconnections are used and where capacity should be increased. Via the possibility to consider investment costs in the specific sharing keys, more certainty can be achieved for a more optimal sharing key for future investments and thus, long-term operation and development of the electricity transmission system and electricity sector in the European Union is supported.
Furthermore, the CID Methodology ensures fair and non-discriminatory treatment of all affected parties, as it sets rules to be applied by all parties. Further, the methodology takes into account Congestion Income derived by Interconnections on bidding zone borders owned by legal entities other than TSOs, preventing exclusion of such Congestion Income from the application of the CID Methodology as long as these Interconnections are operated by certified TSOs.

Regarding the objective of transparency and reliability of information, the CID methodology clearly provides clear rules and a solid basis for Congestion Income distribution in a transparent and reliable way. In addition, the CID Methodology, as well as the specific sharing keys, will be published by TSOs increasing transparency and reliability of information.

In conclusion, the proposed CID Methodology contributes to the general objectives of the CACM Regulation to the benefit of all market participants and electricity end consumers.

SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING CID METHODOLOGY TO ALL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES:

**TITLE 1**  
**General Provisions**

**Article 1**  
**Subject matter and scope**

1. The CID Methodology shall be considered as the common proposal of all TSOs in accordance with Article 73 of CACM Regulation and shall cover the Congestion Income distribution for:
   a. all existing and future Bidding Zone borders and Interconnectors within and between Member States, to which the CACM Regulation applies and where Congestion Income is collected;
   b. Interconnectors which are owned by TSOs or by other legal entities;
   c. Congestion Income derived from Capacity Allocation based on Coordinated NTC Approach and FB Approach; and

2. Where Congestion Income derives from transmission assets owned by legal entities other than TSOs, these parties shall be treated in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. The TSOs operating these assets shall conclude the necessary agreements compliant with this CID Methodology with the relevant transmission asset owners to remunerate them for the transmission assets they operate on their behalf.

**Article 2**  
**Definitions and interpretation**

1. For the purpose of the CID Methodology, terms used in this document shall have the meaning of the definitions included in Article 2 of the CACM Regulation, of Regulation (EC) 714/2009, Directive 2009/72/EC and Commission Regulation (EU) 543/2013.

2. In addition, in this CID Methodology, unless the context requires otherwise, the following terms shall have the meaning below:
   a. “Long Term Transmission Right” means a Physical transmission right or a FTR-option or a FTR – obligation acquired in the forward Capacity Allocation;
b. “Commercial Flow” means the flow over a Bidding Zone border resulting from Single Day-Ahead Coupling or Single Intraday Coupling where it is distinguished as follows:
   i. for CCRs applying Coordinated NTC Approach it means the schedules exchanged over the Bidding Zone border; and
   ii. for CCRs applying the FB Approach it means:
      a) either the additional aggregated flow (AAF) between two adjacent Bidding Zones where the AAF means the flow between two Bidding Zones and is calculated based on the FB parameters and the results of the Capacity Allocation within respective day-ahead or intraday market timeframe; or
      b) a calculated value per Bidding Zone border where the sum of these values per Bidding Zone are equal to the respective net position of the same Bidding Zone to the extent this net position is a result of the Capacity Allocation based on the FB Approach;

c. External Flow means the flow resulting from exchanges within a CCR from the Single Day-Ahead Coupling and Single Intraday Coupling that cannot be directly assigned to a Bidding Zone border of that CCR and is calculated as the flow needed in order to balance the net position resulting from exchanges within the CCR and the sum of AAFs over each Bidding Zone border within the CCR in case where:
   i. AAF is used within a CCR applying the FB Approach; and
   ii. at least two Bidding Zones are connected to an alternative current (“AC”) Interconnector which, as indicated by the FB Approach, carries flows over Bidding Zone borders not included in the same CCR.

d. External Flow Value means the Congestion Income allocated to the External Flow or the External Flow times the Market Spread and it equals the difference between the Congestion Income available for the entire CCR and the Congestion Income allocated to each Bidding Zone border;


f. “Net Border Income” means the Congestion Income allocated per side of a Bidding Zone Border less the corresponding remuneration of Long Term Transmission Rights per Market Time Unit (MTU); and

g. “Market Spread” means the difference between the hourly day-ahead prices of the two concerned bidding zones for the respective market time unit in a specific direction.

3. In addition, in this CID Methodology, unless the context requires otherwise:
   a. a Bidding Zone border may consist of one or more Interconnector(s) for the purposes of the Congestion Income distribution;
   b. the singular indicates the plural and vice versa;
   c. the table of contents and headings are inserted for convenience only and do not affect the interpretation of this CID Methodology; and
   d. any reference to legislation, regulations, directives, orders, instruments, codes or any other enactment shall include any modification, extension or re-enactment of it when in force.

Title 2
Collection and distribution of Congestion Income to the Bidding Zone Borders

Article 3
Process and calculation of Congestion Income
1. In accordance with Article 68(7) and (8) of CACM Regulation, the relevant Central Counter Parties or Shipping Agents shall collect the Congestion Income arising from the Single Day-Ahead Coupling and from the Single Intraday Coupling and shall ensure that collected Congestion Incomes are transferred to the TSOs no later than two weeks after the date of the settlement.

2. For the Day-Ahead Market Time-frame the Congestion Income generated on a Bidding Zone border shall be calculated as the absolute values of the product of the Commercial Flow times the Market Spread. For the Intraday Market Time-Frame the Congestion Income shall be calculated as the sum of all revenues from the Capacity Allocation per MTU.

3. Before the Congestion Income is distributed to each Bidding Zone border any remunerations of Long Term Transmission Rights (LTRs) to be paid by the relevant TSOs in accordance with relevant legislation shall be deducted from the Congestion Income of the relevant Bidding Zone border and relevant TSOs taking into account any additional rule in accordance with Article 7 (3).

4. The relevant Central Counter Parties or Shipping Agents shall distribute the Congestion Income to the TSOs or to an entity appointed by the TSOs, which shall distribute the Congestion Income to the TSOs based on the rules set forth in this document and within the timeframe set in Article 73 (3) of CACM Regulation.

### TITLE 3

**Congestion Income Distribution on the Bidding Zone border**

**Article 4**

**Sharing keys**

1. After the distribution of Congestion Income to each Bidding Zone border, the TSOs on both sides of the Bidding Zone borders shall assign the Congestion Income first to the respective Interconnectors on that Bidding Zone border based on the respective share in installed capacity of the concerned Interconnectors or, in case of HVDC Interconnectors, based on the allocated capacity. Upon agreement by the TSOs on the Bidding Zone border and approval by the relevant national Regulatory Authorities (hereafter referred to as “NRAs”) where they are competent to do so according to national legislation, another parameter may apply which takes into account the Interconnectors’ contribution to the allocated capacity. The Congestion Income assigned to each Interconnector shall then be shared based on the respective applicable sharing key as described in the following provisions.

2. After the assignment of Congestion Income to each Interconnector, the TSOs on each side of the Bidding Zone border shall receive their share of this Congestion Income based on:
   a. either as default:
      i. a 50%-50% sharing key taking into account any additional rules in accordance with Article 7; or
      ii. a 100% sharing key in the cases of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article; or
   b. a specific sharing key for a certain Interconnectors in accordance with Articles 5 to 7 of this CID Methodology.

3. If an Interconnector is 100% owned by a single TSO the TSO shall retain 100% of the Congestion Income assigned to that Interconnector.
4. If an Interconnector is 100% owned by another legal entity and is operated by a TSO or if this Interconnector has an exemption in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, the owner of such an Interconnector shall retain 100% of the Congestion Income assigned to that Interconnector.

**Article 5**

**General Provisions for specific sharing keys and additional rules**

1. Under the conditions described in Articles 6 and 7 the relevant TSOs may agree on an additional rule or a specific sharing key for MTU and for Capacity Allocation timeframe for the distribution of Congestion Income which shall apply to (a) certain Interconnector(s).

2. The relevant TSOs shall agree and submit specific sharing keys and additional rules to the relevant NRAs. The NRAs shall approve such an agreement where they are competent to do so according to national legislation, unless these agreements have been subject to regulatory consideration.

3. The TSOs may agree to limit the duration of the application of an additional rule or a specific sharing key.

4. For Interconnectors on a Bidding Zone border to which a specific sharing key does not apply, the default sharing key in accordance with Article 4 shall remain applicable.

**Article 6**

**Specific sharing keys**

In accordance with Article 5, the relevant TSOs may agree on a specific sharing key if one or more of the following conditions are met:

1. Specific sharing key reflecting the investment costs or the ownership share upon agreement between the relevant TSOs and the owners of an Interconnector.  
   If there is a difference in the investment costs borne by the owners of an Interconnector or the ownership share, the Congestion Income assigned to the respective Interconnector may be distributed to the owners of the Interconnector proportionate to their share in investment costs or ownership.

2. Specific sharing key reflecting the benefits upon agreement between the TSOs within the same Bidding Zone.  
   If a new Interconnector is overall socio-economic efficient, but the socio-economic net benefit is unequally distributed between the affected TSOs of the relevant Bidding Zones the Congestion Income assigned to the respective Interconnector may be distributed to the affected TSOs of the relevant Bidding Zones based on a justified specific sharing key which shall:
   a. reflect the distribution of the net benefits; and  
   b. apply for a limited period which may be prolonged subject to a reassessment of the net benefits.
3. Specific sharing key reflecting Capacity Allocation constraints used for capacity calculation and Capacity Allocation upon agreement by all TSO within a CCR. If a Capacity Allocation constraint, which covers the interdependencies of Capacity Allocation across different Bidding Zone borders is taken into account in the Capacity Allocation of cross zonal capacity, the Congestion Income, collected on the concerned Bidding Zone border(s), shall be distributed amongst the impacted TSOs reflecting the relative impact of this Capacity Allocation constraint.

4. Specific sharing key reflecting future principles related to cross-zonal Capacity Allocation. All TSOs of one or more CCRs may agree on additional specific sharing key(s) for the distribution of Generated Congestion Income addressing interdependencies within and between CCR(s) due to future principles to be developed related to cross-zonal Capacity Allocation. The relevant TSOs shall include a reasoning about the need for such additional specific sharing key(s) in their proposal to be submitted to the NRAs.

**Article 7**

**Additional rules for Congestion Income Distribution**

In addition to the rules described in Article 4, TSOs within a CCR may agree to apply the following rules when distributing the Congestion Income to the Bidding Zone borders of the respective CCR:

1. Rule addressing the External Flow Value: where an External Flow Value exists, a share of 50% of the External Flow Value shall be allocated to the TSOs of the CCR which are hosting the respective External Flows. These TSOs shall allocate this External Flow Value proportionally (pro rata) to the External Flows hosted by each TSO (in MW). The remaining 50% of the External Flow Value shall be shared among all Bidding Zone borders within the CCR, proportionally (pro rata) to the Commercial Flow on each Bidding Zone border within the CCR and the External Flow.

2. Rule addressing Commercial Flows in opposite direction of the market spread (hereafter referred to as “non-intuitive Commercial Flows”): In case of non-intuitive Commercial Flows the TSOs within the same CCR shall redistribute the Congestion Income on each Bidding Zone border as follows:
   a. under the FB Approach, where the AAF has been used to determine the Commercial Flow the absolute values of all Congestion Incomes for all Bidding Zone borders and External Flow Values shall be proportionally adjusted to ensure that their sum matches the Congestion Income which is available for distribution within entire CCR;
   b. under Coordinated NTC approach or when the FB Approach is used and the AAF has not been used to determine the Commercial Flow the involved TSOs shall proportionally adjust all absolute values of all Congestion Incomes for each Bidding Zone border to ensure that their sum matches the Congestion Income which is available for distribution within the entire CCR.

3. Rule addressing non-negative Net Border Income: in case that the remuneration for Long Term Transmission Rights exceed the Congestion Income assigned to a side of a Bidding Zone border
the TSOs within the same CCR shall share the amount of the remuneration of Long Term Transmission Rights which exceeds the Congestion Income of a side of a Bidding Zone border among themselves, proportionally to their Net Border Income from the respective CCR in order to ensure that all Net Border Incomes within the same CCR are non-negative under the conditions that:

a. the determination of offered long term cross-zonal capacity had been coordinated and agreed by the TSOs within the CCR; and

b. the amount of long term cross-zonal capacity which is subject to remuneration (e.g. FTRs or PTRs with UIOSI) does not exceed the day ahead capacity for the respective MTU.

TITLE 4
Final provisions

Article 8
Publication and Implementation of the CID Methodology

1. The TSOs shall publish the CID Methodology without undue delay after all NRAs have approved the proposed CID Methodology or a decision has been taken by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators in accordance with Article 9(11) and 9(12) of the CACM Regulation.

2. The TSOs shall implement it in accordance with the applicable national regulatory regime and at the latest within six (6) months after the approval as referred to in paragraph 1.

3. In case TSOs agree on another parameter in accordance with Article 4(1) or a specific sharing key or an additional rule in accordance with Articles 5, 6 and 7 they shall submit such an agreement to the relevant NRAs within six (6) months after the approval as referred to in paragraph 1.

4. Where NRAs decide, in accordance with national legislation, that a parameter in accordance with Article 4(1) or a CID specific sharing key or an additional rule does not comply with the CID Methodology, the relevant TSOs shall amend the CID specific sharing key or additional rule respectively and re-submit it to the relevant NRAs within two (2) months upon the decision of the relevant NRAs.

5. The implementation dates mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be postponed and existing CID sharing keys between the relevant TSOs shall remain applicable on Bidding Zone borders until the capacity calculation and Capacity Allocation takes place based on the Coordinated NTC Approach or the FB Approach in accordance with the CACM Regulation.

Article 9
Language

The reference language for this CID Methodology shall be English. For the avoidance of doubt, where TSOs need to translate this CID Methodology into their national language(s), in the event of inconsistencies between the English version published by TSOs in accordance with Article 9 (14) of the CACM Regulation and any version in another language the relevant TSOs shall, in accordance with national legislation, provide the relevant NRAs with an updated translation of the CID Methodology.