

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report on Automatic Partial Decoupling with Regards to the Intraday Auction (IDA1) for Delivery Date 16/01/2026**

20.01.2026

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# 1. Executive Summary

This report informs stakeholders on the critical incident related to the Intraday Auction IDA1 for delivery date 16/01/2026.

## Cause of Incident

During IDA1 DD20260116, OMIE was missing the security analysis results from Red Eléctrica, the Spanish Transmission System Operator, needed for their participation in the mentioned IDA on time. This was caused by a long execution time of the TSO security analysis processes. Prior to the Partial Decoupling in Advance deadline, at 14:18, Red Eléctrica informed OMIE that Red Eléctrica expected that the Day-Ahead security analysis results may not be published before 14:55 ("Tal como se ha informado telefónicamente, prevemos que no vamos a poder publicar el Programa Diario Viable Provisional (PDVP) de mañana 16/01/26 antes de las 14:55 h"), given that the TSO security analysis was taking longer than usual.

OMIE called back Red Eléctrica asking for a confirmation of the delay because in their communication Red Eléctrica mentioned "expected" rather than "confirmed" on not being able to publish the security results by 14:55, as it was communicated the previous days. Since there was no confirmation from Red Eléctrica (Red Eléctrica couldn't confirm OMIE whether they would be able to finish the day-ahead security analysis before 14:55), partial decoupling in advance was not performed. The reason is that on the previous day, on DD20260114, Red Eléctrica confirmed by email that they would not send the Day Ahead security analysis before 14:55, consequently, OMIE requested the Partial Decoupling in advance following the procedures. Since Red Eléctrica sent the Day Ahead Security analysis that day at 14:50, it made it impossible for OMIE to be coupled and participate in IDA1 DD20260114

Finally, on DD20260116 the Day-Ahead security analysis results from Red Eléctrica did not arrive on time following the current Spanish Market Rules (14:45 deadline to publish to market participants in normal day, 14:55 deadline in backup process), so OMIE could not participate in IDA1.

Due to the aforementioned reason, and in accordance with the agreed procedures, the following areas were decoupled, which subsequently led to the cancellation of IDA 1 for the following impacted markets/impacted areas:

EPEX - IDA (NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL, NO, SE, FI, DK)

EPEX - BSP- CORE IDA (SI)

EPEX - HUPX- CORE IDA (HU)

OTE (CZ)

EMCO - Nord Pool IDA Nordic Baltic (NO, SE, FI, DK, LT, LI, EE)

EMCO - Nord Pool IDA Core (NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL)

EMCO - IBEX - IDA (BG)

EMCO - CROPEX - IDA (HR)

OPCOM - OKTE (SK)

OPCOM (RO)

TGE - Poland - IDA (PL)

OMIE (ES, PT)

Note that OMIE correctly performed its internal processes for the execution of IDA1 DD20261016, with all OMIE systems and procedures functioning correctly.

## 2. Intraday Auctions Explained

SIDC creates a single EU cross-zonal intraday electricity market. As renewable intermittent production such as solar and wind energy increases, market participants are becoming more interested in trading in the intraday markets. This is because it has become more challenging for market participants to be in balance (i.e. supplying the correct amount of energy) after the closing of the Day-Ahead market.

Complementing the continuous intraday trading, the newly introduced intraday auctions are designed to enhance the efficiency of the market by harmonizing the calculation and allocation of cross-border capacities, while pricing intraday cross-border capacities to reflect their shortage at a given time and thereby send an adequate price signal to the market.

Intraday auctions provide the ability to accumulate offers and efficiently allocate the scarce transmission capacity. This is a novelty in the intraday timeframe, since capacity in the continuous intraday trading was allocated - before the introduction of IDAs - on a first-come first served basis. IDAs are the first intraday auction involving most of the European countries.

See for more information the following websites:


- ▶ [ENTSO-E](#)
- ▶ [NEMO Committee](#)

## 2.1 Normal Process & Timings


### MCSC Daily Timeline



### SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T



### SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15h00 / 22h00 / 10h00 CE(S)T (Including Extension)



Intraday Auctions are organized multiple times per day with a predefined moment in time for the closure of the Orderbooks, commonly known as Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes prior to this Order Book Gate Closure Time, the allocation of Cross Zonal Capacity via Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is halted to allow the TSOs to update capacities based on the latest capacity calculations and accordingly provide the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints to the Intraday Auction. Starting from the Order Book Gate Closure Time, the NEMOs share the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints between the involved NEMO systems. From that same moment on, the NEMOs start delivering their Order Books to the central NEMO systems running the Intraday Auction. As soon as the NEMOs have provided the Order Books the actual coupling starts, considering the Cross Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints.

Once the Intraday Auction results are available, NEMOs start validating the results and these are made available to the TSO for validation by the Capacity Management Module of SIDC and for actual allocation of the Cross Zonal Capacity on respective Bidding Zone Borders. All these steps are to be completed within a strict time window, after which automatically the reopening of cross border trading in Continuous Trading will be triggered, and automatic cancellation of the Intraday Auction will take place.

## 2.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is an unwanted event in the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels connecting them. An incident that requires triggering an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) causing the incident cannot be solved through a (Local) Backup procedure and can thereby breach a deadline of the SIDC.

The operational parties agreed to follow the Incident Management procedure to handle incidents. The Incident Management procedure assumes that communication to relevant third parties (e.g. CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants, etc.) is done by the involved TSOs and NEMOs by following their local procedures.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure outlines how incidents are handled. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of procedures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, closing and restarting market or delivery area(s) or trading service and corresponding local procedures, exchanging files using a backup mode, etc.

As soon as an incident occurs that impacts any of the Single Intraday Market Coupling processes, an Incident Committee (IC) needs to be started, which will be convened by the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator.

Participants to the Incident Committee (IC) identify the issue(s), assess and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC/IDA Coordinator tracks all relevant information on the incident, the discussions during the Incident Committee (IC), and the decision(s) taken during the Incident Committee (IC) call.

At the start of the Incident Committee (IC) the IC SPOC and/or the incident reporter and/or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties discuss actions already taken by the affected party and immediate actions deemed necessary. The parties further consider correct classification of the incident for XBID related incidents.

The parties discuss potential solutions for the incident, where needed, on recommendation of the service provider. Once a solution has been identified, the parties decide on the application of the agreed solution.

During the Incident Committee (IC) the parties also decide on the deemed necessary communication to the market participants.

Within typically 2 hours after closing the Incident Committee (IC) call the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator will create/finalize the Incident Committee (IC) report and make it available to all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties need to review, and if applicable, update the Incident Committee (IC) report. In case of IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC will create the Incident Committee (IC) report and in case of IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator will be in charge.

### 3. Incident Description

#### 3.1 Course of Events

The incident triggered by Red Eléctrica was reported by OMIE during the coupling operations.

#### 3.2 Timeline

Event	Start Date & Time	End Date & Time

Incident occurrence.	15/01/2026 15:00	15/01/2026 15:23
OMIE informed all the NEMOs during the IDA call that due to the lack of necessary information received in time from Red Eléctrica, OMIE was not going to be able to participate in IDA1.	15/01/2026 15:00	
Triggering of Incident Committee.	15/01/2026 15:00	
GME took over the coordinator role because of the Automatic Partial Decoupling.	15/01/2026 15:02	
OMIE order data was still missing, and the Automatic Partial Decoupling was performed, with only GME and HENEX remaining coupled.	15/01/2026 15:12	
IDA1 session was completed, and the IC was closed.	15/01/2026 15:22	
EPEX took back the coordinator role.	15/01/2026 15:23	

### 3.3 Incident Cause

The incident was caused by a long execution time of the TSO security analysis processes which are required by OMIE to participate in the IDA1 session. Prior to the Partial Decoupling in Advance deadline, at 14:18, Red Eléctrica informed OMIE that Red Eléctrica expected that the security analysis results may not be published before 14:55 (“Tal como se ha informado telefónicamente, prevemos que no vamos a poder publicar el Programa Diario Viable Provisional (PDVP) de mañana 16/01/26 antes de las 14:55 h”), given that the TSO security analysis was taking longer than usual.

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to publish the security results by 14:55, as it was communicated the previous days. Since there was no confirmation from Red Eléctrica (Red Eléctrica couldn't confirm OMIE whether they would be able to finish the day ahead security analysis before 14:55), partial decoupling in advance was not performed. The reason is that on the previous day, on DD20260114, Red Eléctrica confirmed by email that they would not send the Day Ahead security analysis before 14:55, consequently, OMIE requested the Partial Decoupling in advance following the procedures. Since Red Eléctrica sent the Day Ahead Security analysis that day at 14:50, it made it impossible for OMIE to be coupled and participate in IDA1 DD20260114

Finally, on DD20260116 the Day Ahead security analysis results from Red Eléctrica did not arrive on time following the current Spanish Market Rules (14:45 deadline to publish to market participants in normal day, 14:55 deadline in backup process), so OMIE could not participate in IDA1.

Consequently, the Automatic Partial Decoupling was triggered, decoupling all areas except Italy and Greece.

**Impacted NEMOs**

All NEMOs besides GME and HENEX.

**Impacted Bidding Zones**

NL, BE, FR, DE/LU, AT, PL, NO, SE, FI, DK, SI, HU, CZ, LT, LI, EE, BG, HR, SK, RO, ES, PT.

**Impacted Borders**

All Borders except the Italian borders and the IT-GR.

## 4. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

<p><b>Short-term Solution by Affected Party</b></p>	<p>In light of this situation of uncertainty, after the incident, on 20/01 OMIE drafted the technical instruction (01/2026). Once the regulators were informed, OMIE published it on 26 January 2026 [<a href="#">LINK</a>].</p> <p>This technical instruction must be applied in the exceptional event that Spanish TSO foresees a delay in publication of the results of Day Ahead security analysis to OMIE.</p>
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	<p>As stated in the technical instruction: "The relevant system operator must send the following message to the market operator as soon as they become aware of the situation, and in any case before 14:25:</p> <p>"We inform you that tomorrow's PDVP (DD/MM/YY) is not expected to be published before 14:54.""</p> <p>In such a situation, the market operator shall make its best efforts to request from the coordinator - and before the deadline established in the European operational procedures (IDA_NEMO_EXC_02: Partial Decoupling) - the decoupling in advance of the MIBEL in IDA1 (i.e., the decoupling of Spain and Portugal). Currently, this deadline is set at 14:30.</p> <p>This process was already used for the Partial Decoupling in Advance from IDA1 DD20/01/2026.</p>
<p><b>Long-term Measures by Affected Party</b></p>	
<p><b>SIDC Project Lessons Learned</b></p>	<p>Both the tight timings between SDAC and IDA1, and the IDA design decision to cancel it in all Europe (with the exception of Italy and Greece) - in case of local issues - negatively affect robustness of IDAs compared with other market mechanisms.</p> <p>In addition, to give more time to resolve potential issues and reduce the frequency of Automatic Partial Decouplings, the deadline of the partial decoupling in advance for IDA1 should be delayed to 14:40.</p>