

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report**

## **Critical Incident Experienced on 15 03 2026**


20.03.2026

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# 1. SIDC Continuous Trading

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU cross-zonal continuous intraday electricity market. In simple terms, buyers and sellers of energy (market participants) are able to work together across Europe to trade electricity continuously on the day the electricity is needed. The map below shows the European countries participating in the continuous intraday market.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.<sup>1</sup>

## 1.1. Normal Operational Process

The process begins when SIDC/XBID contracts open for trading at Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Opening Time (IDCZGOT). Market Participants (MPs) can view the available contracts in each Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) via their Local Trading System (LTS) and submit orders.

Orders from all connected market areas are then consolidated into a single shared order book.

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<sup>1</sup> This report serves to fulfil the obligation under Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) on reporting of unexpected market downtimes towards stakeholders.


If bid and ask prices are crossed, orders are automatically matched and converted into trades. While MPs place orders in the shared order book, the origin of each order is retained. Transmission System Operators (TSOs) make cross-zonal capacity available for allocation in SIDC as additional system capacity is released or recalculated during trading.

Trading in SIDC contracts continues until the relevant contract trading end time or, where applicable, until the Intraday Cross-Zonal Gate Closure Time (IDCZGCT) for cross-zonal trading is reached. Following gate closure, NEMOs continue to offer trading without cross-border capacity allocation, in line with the trading schedules defined in the Shared Order Book.

Finally, electricity is physically delivered for the relevant delivery period. Continuous intraday trading for subsequent delivery periods may continue, subject to applicable gate closure times and the arrangements of the relevant TSO.

The whole process is illustrated in the figure below.

### SIDC continuous normal operation process



\*IDCZGCT 30 project: in some borders, 30-minute IDCZGCT is already available, others will follow. For updates, please follow the NEMO Committee and ENTSO-E websites.

CZC – cross-zonal capacity  
 IDCZGCT – intraday cross-zonal gate **closure** time  
 IDCZGOT – intraday cross-zonal gate **opening** time  
 LTS – local trading system  
 MP – market participants  
 OBK – order book

The next section examines how the incident management process is applied when disruptions occur.

## 1.2. Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event in the XBID system (SIDC's IT solution), in local NEMO or TSO systems connected to XBID, or a disruption of the communication channels linking these systems. An Incident Committee (IC) call is triggered when the issue cannot be resolved

through a local backup procedure and may lead to breaching a critical SIDC deadline (e.g., gate closure or gate opening).

Operational parties follow the incident management procedure to handle such cases. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, shipping agent, explicit participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

The incident management procedure outlines how incidents are addressed, including the operation of the Incident Committee and the application of fallback solutions such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting market or delivery areas, or suspending trading services.

The Incident Committee is convened only for critical or major incidents affecting the XBID system, a Transit Shipping Agent system, or in case of Shipping Agent default. Other incidents may trigger the IC only if they meet predefined criteria. To avoid unnecessary IC calls, parties perform an internal check and cross-check with other parties before escalating an incident as a central issue.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Coupling process, the IC is convened by the IC SPOC. Participants identify the issue, assess its impact, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC records all relevant information, including discussions and decisions made during the call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC or incident reporter presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken and agree on immediate measures, ensuring a correct classification of the incident. Potential solutions are discussed, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation and on any required communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed.

## **2. Incident Description**

This report provides information to stakeholders regarding the critical incident that occurred on 15/03/2026, affecting the Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) market.

On 15/03/2026 there was an outage from 12:56 to 13:40 CET. The cause of the outage has been analyzed by the service provider, and it is related to a degraded performance on three ports causing increasing storage latency. The XBID service provider has indicated that increased storage latency caused a slowdown in system performance and response times. This storage latency led to instability across services, causing XBID modules to go down, and ultimately

resulting in a market outage. The system recovered temporarily after the initial instability events. Service stability returned as system components regained normal operating behavior, even though the underlying storage latency issue remained unresolved. This temporary recovery allowed XBID services to function again.

As a permanent solution, the XBID service provider performed ad hoc maintenance on 16 March by re-aligning the master node setup following the weekend incidents. They also ensured optimal performance by consolidating master node operations within the same data center.

On 17 March, the XBID service provider confirmed an issue affecting three ports and completed corrective actions, restoring normal operations.

The incident is not related to high load in the system.

## **2.1 Course of Events**

At 12:56, a core failover happened.

At 13:00 the IC SPOC noticed that XBID modules were not working and opened a critical ticket with the XBID service provider. All parties confirmed that XBID modules were not working.

At 13:07, the XBID service provider joined the Incident Committee call.

At 13:07, the IC SPOC manually set the market to HALT as agreed by all parties in the call.

At 13:26, the XBID modules were still not working. The XBID service provider asked for time to confirm whether the market could be unhalted.

At 13:33, the XBID service provider confirmed that the system had recovered and the market could be re-opened.

At 13:34, all parties agreed to re-open the XBID markets at 13:40.

At 13:40, the IC SPOC re-opened the XBID markets.

At 13:41, the interconnectors were re-opened by the service provider.

At 13:43, all parties confirmed that XBID trading was ongoing as expected.

At 13:45, all parties agreed to close the call.

## 2.2 Timeline

Event	Time
<b>System failure</b>	2026/03/15 12:56
<b>System recovered</b>	2026/03/15 13:33
<b>Green light from supplier</b>	2026/03/15 13:33
<b>Green light from all parties to start trading</b>	2026/03/15 13:34
<b>Restart of trading</b>	2026/03/15 13:40

## 2.3 Incident Cause

According to the Root Cause Analysis provided by the XBID service provider, increasing storage latency due to degraded performance on three ports was detected on several internal systems. This latency affected various backend components that rely on timely processing, resulting in reduced responsiveness, intermittent disconnections, and degraded system behaviour observed across XBID-related services. During this period, multiple service disruptions occurred, affecting both user-visible functions and internal system processes. The incident is not related to high load in the system. A detailed overview of these events is provided above.

## 2.4 Impact

**Downtime** 15/03/2026: 44 minutes

<b>Critical Business Process Impacted</b>	XBID trading
<b>Procedural Impact</b>	N/A

### 3. Mitigation Measures and Lessons Learned

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue happening again, the following measures have been taken:

**Supplier’s Short-Term Measures**

The system recovered temporarily after the initial instability events. Service stability returned as system components regained normal operating behavior, even though the underlying storage latency issue remained unresolved. This temporary recovery allowed XBID services to function again.

<p><b>Supplier’s Long-Term Measures</b></p>	<p>The XBID service provider resolved the issue through ad hoc maintenance on 16 March by re-aligning the master node setup following the weekend incidents. They also ensured optimal performance by consolidating master node operations within the same data center.</p> <p>On 17 March, the XBID service provider confirmed an issue affecting three ports and completed corrective actions, restoring normal operations</p>
<p><b>SIDC Project Lessons Learnt</b></p>	<p>N/A</p>